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Avoiding the Second Amendment Scrutiny 
Quagmire: 
A Pragmatic Test for Second Amendment 
Challenges Based on International Evidence 
CAMERON SCHLAGEL 
INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of firearms in the United States is a very contentious 
and oft-debated topic.  One of the primary issues is defining the scope of 
the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.  After analyzing the efficacy 
of various international firearm regulations, this note will propose that 
Second Amendment challenges be evaluated under a new pragmatic test. 
The Second Amendment is especially unique in an international 
comparative context because the United States is arguably the only 
country to include a right to bear arms in its Constitution.1 As a result, 
Americans are very divided over, and very passionate about, the 
regulation of firearms.2 Further muddying the water, the scope of the 
 
 J.D., class of 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Editor-in-Chief, Loyola of Los Angeles 
International & Comparative Law Review, Vols. 39 & 40. I would like to thank Professor Allan 
Ides for his guidance and thoughtful commentary on this Note, as well as Professor Kimberly West-
Faulcon for encouraging me to consider going beyond the traditional standards of review, which 
led me to develop the “pragmatic” standard of review proposed herein. I would also like to thank 
the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review for 
their hard work and commitment to excellence. 
 1. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 2 (2013), 
http://loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/index.php (“[a]mong the countries surveyed only Mexico 
was found to have an express provision in its Constitution that recognizes the right of inhabitants 
to bear arms”); see also Wendy Cukier, Tania Sarkar, & Tim Quigley, Firearm Regulation: 
International Law and Jurisprudence, 6 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 116 (2001) (“There is no right to 
bear arms under any international human rights instrument. In terms of domestic rights guarantees, 
the United States appears to be the only jurisdiction in which such a right may have any semblance 
of a legal or constitutional basis”); Ricardo N. Cordova, The Tree’s Acorns and The Gun’s Clips: 
The Battle Between Gun Control Advocates and The Constitutions of the United States, Ireland, 
and Australia, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2010). 
 2. See generally Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which 
Standard Of Scrutiny Should Apply To Gun-Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 85 (Oct. 27, 2010) 
FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2017  7:45 AM 
224 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:2 
Second Amendment “right to bear arms” is less than clear. It was not until 
recently that the Supreme Court defined the extent to which the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to own and possess a firearm. 
In 2008, the Supreme Court addressed and clarified the scope of 
protection afforded by the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. 
Heller.3 Writing for the Heller majority, Justice Scalia stated the Second 
Amendment “confers an individual right to keep and bear arms . . .”4 and 
that like the First and Fourth Amendments, the Second Amendment 
“codified a pre-existing right.”5 Two years later, in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,6 the Court further defined its Second Amendment jurisprudence 
when it held the Second Amendment right recognized by Heller is 
incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
thereby making the right equally applicable to the Federal Government 
and the States.7 Following these two seminal Supreme Court decisions, 
various laws regulating the possession or use of firearms have been 
challenged across the country. 
Adjudicating Second Amendment challenges has been particularly 
difficult for post Heller-McDonald courts because, while the 
determinations made by the Court in Heller and McDonald significantly 
clarified the scope of contemporary Second Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Court did not determine the appropriate judicial standard of review 
applicable to Second Amendment challenges.
8
 As a result, lower courts 
are divided over whether Second Amendment challenges should be 
reviewed under strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny or a type of tiered 
scrutiny.
9
 Choosing the standard of review to apply to cases where 
 
(discussing their respective opinions regarding the efficacy of gun-control in the context of 
choosing a Second Amendment standard of review). 
 3. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 4. Id. at 622 (emphasis added). 
 5. Id. at 592 (emphasis in original). 
 6. McDonald v. City of Chicago, III, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 7. Id. at 791. 
 8. See generally, Jason T. Anderson, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the 
Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547 (2009) 
(discussing the Heller decision, specifically that the Supreme Court declined to adopt a judicial 
standard of review applicable to Second Amendment cases, and arguing that the Intermediate 
standard of review is most appropriately applicable to Second Amendment cases); Rosenthal & 
Malcolm, supra note 2 (debating both the Heller and McDonald holdings, their effect on gun 
regulation, and the applicable standard of review). 
 9. See generally United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that 
other circuits have evaluated Second Amendment cases using “varying rationales”); Larisa 
Vaysman, Sixth Circuit Holds Ban On Gun Possession After Commitment to Mental Institution 
Violates Second Amendment, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS: SIXTH CIRCUIT APP. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2014), 
http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/sixth-circuit-holds-ban-on-gun-
possession-after-commitment-to-mental-institution-violates-second-amendment/ (stating that in 
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government regulation of a constitutional right is challenged is 
particularly important because the standard of review directly affects the 
viability of the law or regulation at bar.
10
 Due to the unique nature of the 
interests at stake in Second Amendment challenges—the constitutional 
right to bear arms on one side and governmental concerns for public 
safety on the other—lower courts have been unable to agree on the 
standard of review applicable to Second Amendment challenges. 
Proponents of gun regulations claim there is a direct correlation 
between the availability of firearms and high homicide rates in the United 
States.
11
 From this premise, proponents argue that government 
regulations which aim to limit the use and possession of firearms will 
result in a decrease in homicides and mass shootings such as the Sandy 
Hook tragedy.
12
 Proponents often cite the strict firearms regulations 
adopted by other developed nations such as Australia and the United 
Kingdom.
13
 Meanwhile, those opposed to gun regulations claim that strict 
governmental regulation of firearms results in increased homicide rates.
14
 
The basis for the opposition’s claim is that firearm regulations typically 
deprive law-abiding citizens of their right to bear arms, while criminals—
 
Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Dept., the court held “alone and in opposition to nine other 
circuits” by applying the strict scrutiny standard of review to a Second Amendment case involving 
the right of a person previously committed to a mental institution to own a gun). 
 10. See DONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 18.3(a)(i) (2014). 
 11. See e.g., Jonathan Masters, U.S. Gun Policy: Global Comparisons, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS. http://www.cfr.org/society-and-culture/us-gun-policy-global-comparisons/p29735 
(last updated June 24, 2015) (stating that “The United States . . . has about 35-50 percent of the 
world’s civilian owned guns . . . . It ranks number one in firearms per capita. The United States also 
has the highest homicide-by-firearm rate among the world’s most developed nations”). John 
Donohue, Gun Control: What We Can Learn From Other Advanced Countries, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 
3, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/gun-control-what-we-can-learn-other-advanced-countries-
379105. 
 12. See Donahue, supra note 11. 
 13. Id.; see also Anthony Faiola, After Shooting Tragedies, Britain Went After Guns, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 1, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-shooting-tragedies-
britain-went-after-guns/2013/01/31/b94d20c0-6a15-11e2-9a0b-db931670f35d_story.html. 
 14. See e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND 
GUN CONTROL LAWS (1998) (discussing the contributing factors behind criminal behavior and the 
ineffectiveness of gun-control regulations); David Paulin, Piers Morgan and The Failure of British 
Gun Control: Could The CNN Host Really Be So Ignorant of His Own Country’s Recent History?, 
FRONTPAGE MAG, Jan. 1, 2013, http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/171264/piers-morgan-and-
failure-british-gun-control-david-paulin (discussing the similarity between the Newtown, Conn., 
school massacre and how anti-gun pundits like Piers Morgan neglect statistics from countries like 
the UK). 
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who are, by definition, not law-abiding—continue to use and possess 
firearms at higher rates.
15
 
The next logical progression of the Supreme Court’s Second 
Amendment jurisprudence would be to determine the judicial standard of 
review applicable to Second Amendment challenges. The Court’s 
determination is particularly important because it will have a long 
standing impact on the scope of the Second Amendment right to bear 
arms and the viability of governmental firearm regulations in the United 
States. Consistent with Justice Stephen Breyer’s opinion that 
international law can be particularly relevant to the Supreme Court’s 
contemporary constitutional interpretation,
16
 this note suggests the 
Court’s decision must be guided by a comparative analysis of the history 
and statistical efficacy of firearms regulations in other developed nations. 
Contrary to the United States, many other developed nations have long 
histories of strict governmental firearms regulations. Thus, there is a 
relatively large body of empirical research analyzing the efficacy of 
firearm regulations in these countries, an analysis of which, would be 
valuable to guide the Court’s ultimate decision. 
Part I of this note will briefly discuss the comparatively unique 
constitutional guarantee of the right to bear arms in the United States, the 
current state of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence 
and how lower courts have addressed the standard of review issue.  Part 
II will consist of an in-depth analysis of the history and statistical efficacy 
of firearm regulations in: Australia, Canada, and Great Britain/UK. Part 
III will discuss the implications of choosing a standard of review and, 
after synthesizing the information presented in Parts I and II, will suggest 
 
 15. See generally Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder 
and Suicide?: A Review of International and Some Domestic Evidence, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 650 (2007). 
 16. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Supreme Court in an Interdependent World, WALL STREET 
J., Sept. 14, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-court-in-an-interdependent-world-
1442272247; Nina Totenberg, Law Beyond Our Borders: Justice Breyr Is On A Mission, N.P.R., 
Sept. 14, 2015, 5:02 AM, http://www.npr.org/2015/09/14/439514086/law-beyond-our-borders-
justice-breyer-is-on-a-mission; Adam Liptak, Justice Breyer Sees Value in a Global View of Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/us/politics/justice-breyer-sees-
value-in-a-global-view-of-law.html?_r=0; Robert Barnes, Breyer says understanding foreign law 
is critical to the Supreme Court’s work, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/breyer-says-understanding-foreign-law-is-
critical-to-supreme-courts-work/2015/09/12/36a38212-57e9-11e5-8bb1-
b488d231bba2_story.html?utm_term=.dd47241090d6; Andrew Strickler, In Globalized World, 
Breyer Urges Closer Look at Foreign Law, LAW 360, Apr. 14, 2016, 8:30 PM, 
https://www.law360.com/articles/782885/in-globalized-world-breyer-urges-closer-look-at-
foreign-law. 
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that the Court adopt the pragmatic test proposed herein as the judicial 
standard of review for Second Amendment challenges. 
PART I 
Judicial review of an alleged government violation of a 
constitutionally protected right is predicated upon the application of a 
particular standard of review. Standards of review provide a framework 
for the trier of fact to determine whether the challenged law has infringed 
upon a constitutionally protected right.
17
 The amount of judicial 
deference given to the legislature is determined by the purpose of the 
legislative act and the degree of relationship between the “asserted 
governmental end”
18
 and the type of protected conduct being infringed 
upon.
19
 
Strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are “quintessential 
balancing inquiries that focus ultimately on whether a particular 
government interest is sufficiently compelling or important to justify an 
infringement on the individual right in question.”
20
 Strict scrutiny has 
traditionally been applied to cases involving “preferred liberties entitled 
to more stringent judicial protection.”
21
 This particularly austere standard 
of review requires the law at bar to be “narrowly tailored”
22
 to further a 
“compelling governmental interest.”
23
 Put another way, the government 
“bears the burden of proving that the law is in fact necessary to achieve a 
compelling state interest”
24
 and that the law is “the least restrictive means 
of achieving the government’s purpose.”
25
 In comparison to strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is a more flexible standard of review, 
allowing for a (minimal) degree of deference to the legislature.
26
 Laws 
reviewed under the intermediate scrutiny standard will be upheld if they 
“serve important governmental objectives and . . . are substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives.”
27
 
 
 17. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 556. 
 18. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10. 
 19. Id.; see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 707 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 20. Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 323 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2011)), rev’d en banc, 
837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 21. Anderson, supra note 8, at 563 (internal quotations omitted). 
 22. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 707 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)). 
 23. Anderson, supra note 8, at 562. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 561. 
 26. Id. at 560–61. 
 27. Id. at 562 (internal quotations omitted). 
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Generally, although not mandated by the Court in Heller, most 
circuit courts have evaluated Second Amendment challenges by applying 
a two-step approach where the court “(1) asks whether the challenged law 
burdens the conduct protected by the Second Amendment and (2) if so, 
directs courts to apply an appropriate level of scrutiny.”
28
 While the first 
step of this approach is vitally important, the second step—in which the 
court determines and applies the appropriate standard of review—is the 
topic discussed in this note. In the context of the standard of review, it is 
worth noting that the majority in Heller rejected the use of the interest-
balancing inquiry or rational basis review proposed by Justice Breyer in 
his dissenting opinion.
29
 Based on the rejection of Justice Breyer’s 
proposed approach, it follows that post-Heller courts are likely confined 
to the application of one of the remaining two standards: the strict 
scrutiny standard of review or the intermediate scrutiny standard of 
review
30
—neither of which, this note argues, is appropriate for review of 
Second Amendment challenges. Although Justice Breyer’s interest-
balancing approach was rejected, it remains useful to an analysis to 
determine the appropriate standard of review, and is, thus, discussed in 
Part III of this note. The majority of lower courts have chosen to apply 
intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges, while others 
have applied some other level of scrutiny—less than strict scrutiny—such 
as a “multi-tiered”
31
 or “hybrid”
32
 approach where the standard of review 
depends on the type of Second Amendment conduct being regulated.
33
 
One Sixth Circuit panel, 
34
 that was subsequently reversed, has 
 
 28. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (joining the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits in evaluating Second Amendment claims under the two-step approach). 
 29. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (Justice Scalia stating that “[w]e know of no other enumerated 
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding interest balancing 
approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third 
Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really 
worth insisting upon.”). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469 (4th Cir. 2011) (where the 
appellate court, discussing the standard of review for Second Amendment cases, stated that “The 
Court did . . . rule out a rational basis review . . . [and] by listing several ‘presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures’ . . . the Court provided a hint as to the types of governmental interests that 
might be sufficient to withstand Second Amendment challenges, as well as the contexts in which 
those interests could be successfully invoked” (citation omitted)). 
 31. Tyler, 775 F.3d at 324. 
 32. Id. at 325. 
 33. Id. (noting that the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all either 
adopted an approach based on the conduct being regulated, similar to First Amendment standards 
of review, or employed a level of scrutiny less than strict (arguably intermediate) but allowed for 
the future imposition of strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny depending on the circumstances). 
 34. Tyler, 775 F.3d at 328–29 (setting forth the court’s reasons for choosing strict scrutiny 
over intermediate scrutiny). 
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determined that strict scrutiny should be applied to Second Amendment 
challenges.
35
 
The division among the circuits created in the wake of Heller and 
McDonald has been noted by one court, which stated that “[t]he 
appropriate level of scrutiny that courts should apply in Second 
Amendment cases . . . remains a difficult, highly contested question,”
36
 
and “Heller has left in its wake a morass of conflicting lower court 
opinions regarding the proper analysis to apply to challenged firearms 
regulations . . . The general trend, however, has been in favor of some 
form of intermediate scrutiny.”
37
 
PART II: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL FIREARMS-CONTROL 
LEGISLATION 
A. Common Regulatory Themes Among Other Developed Nations 
The majority of developed nations around the world regulate the 
possession and use of firearms more strictly than the United States.
38
 
Many of the countries surveyed began regulating firearms to respond to 
mass shootings similar to the shootings at Columbine High School and 
Sandyhook Elementary in the United States.
39
 One of the common 
themes among other developed countries is the requirement for citizens 
to obtain a firearm license.
40
 All the countries discussed in this note have 
adopted some form of a licensing requirement.
41
 While the prerequisites 
for obtaining a firearm license varies among the countries discussed in 
this section, national licensing requirements are among the most apparent 
differences between the regulatory approach of other developed nations 
and that of the United States. Additionally, many countries do not 
recognize concerns for self-defense as a valid reason to obtain a firearm 
 
 35. However, it could be argued that the standard of review the Seventh Circuit has utilized 
is more closely related to strict scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 
651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (“a more rigorous showing than that applied in Skoien should be 
required, if not quite strict scrutiny”). 
 36. Tyler, 775 F.3d at 326. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally, Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1 (the comparative 
analysis of “the different legal approaches taken by eighteen countries and the European Union 
with regard to ownership, possession, and other activities involving firearms” by the Law Library 
of Congress generally supports the contention that the firearm regulations in the United States are 
among the most lenient in the world). 
 39. Id. at 1–2. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 4–12 table 1. 
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license.
42
 The general requirement for firearm licenses notwithstanding, 
this view stands in stark contrast to the majority viewpoint in the United 
States that—arguably—the “core” protection of the Second Amendment 
is the right to possess a firearm for self-defense within one’s home.
43
 
Other common themes present among most, if not all, the countries 
surveyed include: requiring criminal background checks, determinations 
of mental and physical health (often ascertained through the disclosure 
and examination of an individual’s medical records or through 
independent fitness examinations), performance of a firearm safety 
course and/or test, minimum age requirements, laws regulating the means 
by which firearms are transported and stored, and proof of residency in 
the jurisdiction.
44
 
B. Firearms Regulation by Country:  
Australia, Canada, and Great Britain 
1. Australia 
Australia has some of the most comprehensive firearms regulations 
in the world. Under the Australian Constitution’s commerce provisions, 
the federal government has the power to regulate the cross-border trade 
of firearms, while the State and Territorial governments of Australia carry 
the responsibility to adopt specific and more localized firearms 
regulations.
45
 The Australian Constitution does not contain any guarantee 
of the right to bear arms.
46
 Prior to a mass shooting in 1996, Australian 
firearms regulations were relatively lenient compared to their 
international counterparts.
47
 In response to a mass shooting in the Port 
Arthur area, where a lone gunman carrying a semiautomatic rifle killed 
thirty-five people and wounded eighteen others, the state and federal 
governments of Australia agreed to the National Firearms Agreement 
(“NFA”) proposed by the Australian Police Ministers’ Council 
(“APMC”) in 1996.
48
 The provisions of the agreement were based in 
large part on findings made by the National Committee on Violence, 
 
 42. See id. 
 43. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, many legal scholars have interpreted Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion as limiting the “core” of the second amendment right to the purpose of 
self-defense in one’s home. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 555, 574; Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra 
note 2, at 447. This interpretation of Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion will be discussed in more detail 
in Part III of this note. 
 44. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 4–12 table 1. 
 45. Id. at 17. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 16–17. 
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which had been established in 1988 to study methods for the prevention 
of violent crime.
49
 After the universal adoption of the agreement, various 
firearms regulations imposed by each respective state and territory 
underwent considerable revisions to reflect the new national standard for 
the regulation of firearms.
50
 The agreement also led to the formation of a 
national buyback program “to encourage firearms owners and dealers to 
surrender [newly] prohibited weapons.”
51
 
The uniform approach of the 1996 NFA established regulations 
which include, but are not limited to: (1) national bans on the import of 
semi-automatic assault weapons
52
 and their corresponding parts or 
implements, and on any trade or resale of said firearms within Australia;
53
 
(2) categorical classification of firearms making it easier to regulate 
groups of firearms based on common characteristics;
54
 (3) permit 
requirements for every type of firearm with a twenty-eight-day waiting 
period after the application is complete;
55
 and (4) restrictions on the 
purchase of ammunition and requirements for the storage of firearms.
56
 
Prerequisites for permit approval include: (1) applicants must be at 
least eighteen years of age and are required to complete a standardized 
safety training course, and (2) applicants must demonstrate a “genuine 
reason”—not including self-defense—to obtain a permit.
57
  Permits may 
be refused based on the presence of criminal convictions for violent 
offenses within the five years prior to the permit application or “reliable 
evidence of a mental or physical condition which would render the 
applicant unsuitable for owning, possessing, or using a firearm.”
58
 
Each respective Australian state or territory amended their previous 
firearms regulations to conform to the guidelines contained in the NFA.
59
 
Additionally, the Australian national government established a twelve-
 
 49. Id. at 17. 
 50. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 51. Id. at 18. 
 52. Id. at 19 (described as all semi-automatic self-loading and pump action longarms, and all 
parts, including magazines, for such firearms, included in License Category D, and control of the 
importation of those firearms included in License Category C”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (e.g., firearms such as “certain semiautomatic and self-loading rifles and shotguns,” 
which are included in categories C and D, are strictly regulated and must be stored in approved gun 
safes). 
 55. Id. at 20. 
 56. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 20–21 (ammunition may only 
be purchased in limited quantities within a given period and firearms and ammunition must be 
stored in separate locked containers). 
 57. Id. at 20. 
 58. Id. at 21 (quotations omitted). 
 59. Id. at 21. 
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month grace period, a firearms buyback program, and a nationwide 
education program to encourage compliance with the new regulations.
60
 
The resolution also provided for the imposition of “severe penalties” for 
any breaches of the new regulations at the end of the grace period.
61
 In a 
2008 study, the Australian Institute of Criminology (“AIC”) determined 
the various states and territories had generally complied with the 
provisions of the 1996 agreement.
62
 
The buyback program led to the surrender of more than six-hundred 
thousand firearms.
63
 One study stated that “[i]n terms of the absolute 
number of guns destroyed, Australia’s gun buyback ranks as the largest 
destruction of civilian firearms in any country over the period 1991–
2006.”
64
 Notwithstanding the general success of the buyback program, 
there was an increase in the illegal trade of firearms in Australia after the 
implementation of the 1996 agreement.
65
 To curb this problem, the 
APMC enacted the National Firearm Trafficking Policy Agreement in 
July 2002.
66
 This agreement provided for increased border control, 
national regulations of firearm manufacturing, heightened recording 
requirements for firearms dealers, and harsher penalties for violations of 
the 1996 agreement and/or the 2002 agreement.
67
 In October 2002, a lone 
gunman with several handguns killed two people and injured five others 
at Monash University in Melbourne, Victoria.
68
 The gunman was a 
licensed firearm owner who, as determined at his trial, suffered an 
apparent “mental impairment.”
69
 This incident led the legislature to enact 
further regulations to restrict the import, use, and possession of certain 
types of handguns.
70
 As part of the regulatory scheme, the Australian 
parliament also enacted the National Handgun Buyback Act in 2003, 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 21. 
 63. Id. at 22. 
 64. Id. (quoting Andrew Leigh & Christine Neill, Do Gun Buybacks Save Lives? Evidence 
from Panel Data, 12 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 510 (2010), http://andrewleigh.org/
pdf/GunBuyback_Panel.pdf). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 22–23. 
 68. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 23. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The new handgun regulations prohibited the sale of handguns with a caliber exceeding .38 
(with limited exception for participation in a “specifically accredited sporting event”), a barrel 
length less than 120-mm for semiautomatic handguns and 100-mm for single shot handguns, and a 
magazine capacity exceeding 10 rounds. Id. at 24. 
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which compensated citizens who surrendered handguns that were not in 
compliance with the new restrictions.
71
 
a. Impact and Statistical Efficacy of Australia’s Firearm Regulations 
Following the adoption of the 1996 agreement, the AIC established 
a national monitoring program to track the incidence of homicide and 
violent crime, as well as the type of weapons used in the commission of 
these crimes.
72
 Due in large part to the AIC’s program, as well as 
additional independent studies, there is an abundance of statistical 
information regarding the use of firearms in violent crimes. This 
information provides a basis from which a discussion can be had over 
whether there is a positive relationship between strict governmental 
regulation of firearms and the rate of homicides and violent crimes. 
Several economists, professors, and legal scholars have analyzed the 
statistics provided by the AIC and reached differing conclusions 
regarding whether Australia’s strict regulatory scheme has had a 
substantial impact on the violent crime rates.
73
 
A 2003 report by representatives of the AIC found a 47% decrease 
in firearm-related deaths over a period from 1991 to 2001.
74
 Firearm 
suicides accounted for 77% of the firearm-related deaths, while firearm 
homicides accounted for 15%.
75
 It is worth noting that a number of 
scholars have criticized the inclusion of suicide deaths in studies 
analyzing the efficacy of firearm regulations.
76
 Notwithstanding the 
importance of suicide prevention, one criticism of including those 
statistics is that, in general, the primary purpose of firearm regulations is 
to reduce the use of firearms in association with violent crimes.
77
 
 
 71. Id. at 18. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Wang-Sheng Lee & Sandy Suardi, The Australian Firearms Buyback and Its Effect 
on Gun Deaths (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, Working Paper 
No. 17/08), http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/downloads/working_paper_series/wp2008n17.
pdf; Jeanine Baker & Samara McPhedran, Gun Laws and Sudden Death: Did the Australian 
Firearms Legislation of 1996 Make a Difference?, BR. J. CRIMINOLOGY (2006), 
http://armsandthelaw.com/archives/GunLawsSudden%20DeathBJC.pdf; Christine Neill & 
Andrew Leigh, Weak Tests and Strong Conclusions: A Re-Analysis of Gun Deaths and the 
Australian Firearms Buyback, 12 AUSTL. NAT’L U. CTR. ECON. POL’Y, Discussion Paper No. 555, 
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/45285/3/DP555.pdf. 
 74. Jenny Mouzos & Catherine Rushforth, Firearms Related Deaths in Australia, 1991–2001, 
AIC TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE No. 269, at 1 (Nov. 2003), 
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi269/view%20paper.html. 
 75. Id. at 2. 
 76. See Baker & McPhedran, supra note 73; Lee & Suardi, supra note 73; LOTT, supra note 
14. 
 77. See, e.g., LOTT, supra note14, at 10–11. 
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Additionally, because of the political nature of firearm regulation, there 
is a tendency for individuals to point to these studies as evidencing the 
efficacy of firearm regulations without disclosing the fact that the overall 
decline in “firearm-related deaths” is primarily due to a substantial 
decrease in suicide deaths.
78
 In addition to the reports prepared by the 
AIC, other non-governmental studies have utilized the statistics collected 
by the AIC, as well as other intergovernmental organizations, to analyze 
the efficacy of Australian firearm regulations.
79
 
A 2006 study by Jeanine Baker and Samara McPhedran analyzed 
the effects of the NFA on firearm-related deaths and was published in the 
British Journal of Criminology.
80
 Baker and McPhedran analyzed data 
obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the AIC, and the 
National Injury Surveillance Unit, focusing on the period ranging from 
1979–2004.
81
  The stated goal of the study was to “[o]bjectively 
determine whether the intervention of the 1996 NFA . . . achieved the 
early predictions of a reduction in all ‘types’ of firearm-related deaths.”
82
 
Baker and McPhedran concluded that “examination of the sudden death 
categories presented here indicates that evidence [of] overall reductions 
is tenuous at best, with only firearm suicide rates post-NFA being 
significantly different from those predicted and the observed rates.”
83
 
They found the rate of firearm suicides continued to decline before and 
after the implementation of the NFA.
84
 However, the authors noted the 
poor reliability of suicide statistics due to the rate of suicide being 
“[h]ighly influenced by other societal changes,
85
 confounding the ability 
to discern any effect on firearm suicides that may have resulted from the 
NFA.”
86
 Analysis of firearm homicide statistics reflected a pattern of 
steady decline in firearm homicides prior to the implementation of the 
NFA, which remained on a consistent course after the NFA’s 
implementation in 1996.
87
 Based on the lack of a statistically significant 
 
 78. See, e.g., Margot Sanger-Katz, Gun Deaths Are Mostly Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/upshot/gun-deaths-are-mostly-suicides.html?_r=0 
(explaining that there is a common misconception in America when we think about gun deaths; we 
focus on homicide). 
 79. See Baker & McPhedran, supra note 73; Lee & Suardi, supra note 73; Neill & Leigh, 
supra note 73. 
 80. Baker & McPhedran, supra note 73. 
 81. Id. at 3–4. 
 82. Id. at 3. 
 83. Id. at 10. 
 84. Id. at 5, 10–11. 
 85. Id. (employment levels, financial well-being, and the increased availability of suicide 
prevention programs or support networks were among the societal changes noted by the authors). 
 86. Baker & McPhedran, supra note 73, at 10. 
 87. Id. at 7. 
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decline in firearm homicides after the NFA was implemented, Baker and 
McPhedran found “the NFA had no effect on firearm homicide in 
Australia.”
88
 Furthermore, the authors noted “a ground-breaking 
Australian study” which found that, “over 90 percent of firearms used to 
commit homicide were not registered and the perpetrators were not 
licensed.”
89
 
Later, in a 2007 study, economists Christine Neill and Andrew 
Leigh “highlight[ed] important flaws” in the analytical approach taken by 
Baker and McPhedran, and stated their disagreement with Baker and 
McPhedran’s conclusion that “the gun buy-back and restrictive 
legislative changes had no influence on firearm homicide in Australia.”
90
 
Neil and Leigh disagreed with Baker and McPhedran’s use of non-
firearm deaths as a control group and a test for method substitution, from 
which they argued Baker and McPhedran could “draw virtually any 
conclusion they wish.”
91
 The authors found that re-analyzing the data 
over a longer period “[s]trengthens the evidence against the null 
hypothesis that the NFA had no effect on firearm suicides or homicides, 
and more than doubles the estimated number of lives saved.”
92
 Neil and 
Leigh emphasized that the “high degree of variability” in the data 
suggests the time series approach employed by Baker and McPhedran 
“cannot conclusively answer the question of whether the NFA cut gun 
deaths.”
93
 Neil and Leigh concluded that, “to the extent that time series 
evidence points anywhere, it is towards the conclusion that the NFA 
reduced gun deaths.”
94
 
In arguably the most comprehensive study to date, Wang-Sheng Lee 
and Sandy Suardi re-analyzed the same data as previous studies over the 
same extended time period as Neil and Leigh in an attempt to “resolve 
the debate surrounding the effects of the NFA.”
95
 Lee and Suardi 
employed an extensive battery of structural break tests
96
 and conducted a 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 11. 
 90. Neill & Leigh, supra note 73, at 1 (quoting Baker & McPhedran, supra note73, at 9). 
 91. Id. at 9. 
 92. Id. at 12. 
 93. Id. at 13. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Lee & Suardi, supra note 73, at 3 (The authors noted the existence of a “considerable 
rhetorical debate regarding the impact of the NFA on firearm homicide” in Australia despite 
considerable research using homicide statistics from the same source). 
 96. The authors first examined the stationarity of the data and the order of the ARIMA model, 
and subsequently tested the data utilizing the Quandt Test, the Bai Sequential Multiple Break Test, 
and the Bai and Perron Test, all of which are structural break tests. Id. 
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“rigorous analysis” of the available data.
97
 The authors also analyzed the 
rate of homicides and suicides, by means other than a firearm, to 
determine whether the NFA had any “substitution effects—that reduced 
access to firearms may have led those bent on committing homicide or 
suicide to use alternative methods.”
98
 Lee and Suardi found “[l]ittle 
evidence to suggest that [the NFA] had any significant effects on firearm 
homicides and suicides.”
99
 Additionally, they found no evidence of any 
substitution effects.
100
 Lee and Suardi ultimately concluded that 
“although gun buybacks appear to be a logical and sensible policy that 
helps placate the public’s fears, the evidence so far suggests that in the 
Australian context, the high expenditure incurred to fund the 1996 gun 
buyback has not translated into any tangible reduction in terms of firearm 
deaths.”
101
 
2. Canada 
Canada has a history of relatively strict gun control measures, with 
strict gun control laws being passed as early as 1976.
102
 Currently, 
firearms in Canada are regulated on the federal level under the 1995 
Firearms Act and Part III of the Criminal Code (“CFA”).
103
 The 
“[p]ossession, transport, and storage of firearms” all fall within the 
provisions of the CFA and corresponding provisions of the Criminal 
Code.
104
 Additionally, Canadian provinces, territories, and municipalities 
may impose additional firearm regulations.
105
 The Criminal Code 
classifies firearms into three categories of regulated firearms under the 
1995 Act: restricted, prohibited, and non-restricted.
106
 Firearms are 
separated into these categories based on common characteristics such as 
the typical use of the firearm (e.g., hunting) or physical characteristics, 
such as fully automatic firearms.
107
 
 
 97. Id.   
 98. Id. at 4, 23. 
 99. Id. at 23. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 23–24. 
 102. Catherine F. Sproule & Deborah J. Kennett, The Use of Firearms in Canadian Homicides 
1972–1982: The Need for Gun Control, 30 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 31, 32 (1988). 
 103. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 52. The CFA is codified as: 
Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39 (Can.) [hereinafter CFA]. 
 104. Id. at 53. 
 105. Id. at 52. 
 106. Id. at 52–53. 
 107. Id. at 53 (the non-restricted category includes “ordinary shotguns and rifles”; the restricted 
and prohibited categories include rifles “that can be folded to shorter than . . . 26 inches,” most 
types of handguns, and fully automatic or military style firearms). 
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Under the Firearms Act, citizens are required to obtain a license—
known as a Possession and Acquisition License (“PAL”)—in order to 
purchase or possess a firearm or to buy ammunition.
108
 PAL’s are 
“generally valid for five years, and must be renewed before they 
expire.”
109
 Licenses are only issued if the applicant is at least eighteen-
years-old and has “met certain public-safety criteria and is allowed to 
possess and use firearms.”
110
 To obtain a license for a non-restricted 
firearm, applicants must past the Canadian Firearms Safety Course 
(“CFSC”) and corresponding tests.
111
 For the restricted or prohibited 
categories of firearms, applicants “must pass the Canadian Restricted 
Firearms Safety Course (“CRFSC”) in addition to the CFSC.”
112
 The 
acquisition and possession of firearms in the restricted or prohibited 
categories is strictly regulated.
113
 Generally, firearms in the 
aforementioned categories may only be possessed in the licensee’s 
residence, can only be transported and/or used under very limited 
circumstances,
114
 and cannot be transferred to another license holder 
without being verified by “an approved verifier.”
115
 
The CFA also requires applicants to pass a comprehensive 
background check, which “consider[s] criminal, mental, addiction and 
domestic violence records.”
116
 Additionally, each applicant is also 
required to present third party character references.
117
 Applicants are 
screened through a two-tiered process which “[e]ntails submitting an 
application requesting that the applicant provide detailed personal 
information; when this application is assessed by the CFP, special 
attention is given to those applying for a Prohibited and Restricted 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 55. 
 110. Id. at 53 (quoting Canadian Firearms Program: Frequently Asked Questions – General, 
RCMP, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/cfp-pcaf/faq/index-eng.htm#al (last updated Sept. 21, 2012)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 54. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. (The limited circumstances include, for example, target practice or use in a target 
shooting competition). 
 115. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
 116. The Act states that in addition to criminal background checks, authorities must also 
consider whether the applicant “has been treated for a mental illness . . . that was associated with 
violence or threatened or attempted violence . . . or has a history of behavior that includes violence 
or threatened or attempted violence on the part of the person against any person.” Id. at 56 (quoting 
Canada – Gun Facts, Figures and the Law, GUNPOLICY.ORG, http://www.gunpolicy.org/
firearms/region/canada) (last updated Dec. 21, 2012); see also CFA, supra note 103, § 5( 2)(b). 
 117. See Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 56. 
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Firearm License.”
118
 The screening process does not terminate when an 
applicant is approved for a license.
119
 After an applicant has been granted 
a license, they are subject to ongoing screening where a licensee may be 
flagged for review if the licensee violates one of the provisions for 
“continuous eligibility.”
120
 Furthermore, licensees are subject to laws 
which regulate the methods of storing, transporting, or displaying 
firearms, as well as the firearm laws or regulations of the licensee’s 
province.
121
 
a. Impact and Statistical Efficacy of Canada’s Firearm Regulations 
Due in part to the Canadian government maintaining a 
comprehensive database tracking crime statistics, a number of studies 
have been conducted to examine the efficacy of Canada’s Firearm 
legislation on firearm-related deaths.
122
 A majority of independent 
studies have either found that the Firearms Act has had no effect on gun 
violence or that the effect has been statistically insignificant.
123
 While 
there have been studies showing that the Firearms Act has led to a 
reduction in suicides involving a firearm,
124
 there is little, if any, scholarly 
analysis purporting to show the effectiveness of the Firearms Act in 
 
 118. Id. at 56 (quoting Royal Canadian Mounted Police, RCMP Canadian Firearms Program: 
Program Evaluation – Final Approved Report 38 (Feb. 2010), http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/
pubs/fire-feu-eval/eval-eng.pdf). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 56–57 (Non-restricted firearms are required to be secured with a locking device that 
prevents the firearm from being fired and to be stored in an area or container that is difficult to 
break into. All firearms must be unloaded and locked in a secure container during transportation. 
Holders of restricted and/or prohibited firearm licenses must also obtain a transportation permit 
from the local authority.). 
 122. Id. at 58. See e.g., Canada – Gun Facts, Figures and the Law, supra note 116 (discussing 
Canadian firearm regulations); Robert J. Mundt, Gun Control and Rates of Firearms Violence in 
Canada and the United States, 32 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 137, 152 (1990) (stating that Canadian 
firearm regulations has had little “perceptible impact” on homicide statistics); Gary A. Mauser, 
Evaluating Canada’s 1995 Firearm Legislation, 17 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2005) (stating 
“[t]here has been no discernible impact on public safety by the firearm program”) [hereinafter 
Evaluating Canada’s 1995 Firearm Legislation]; Caillin Langmann, Canadian Firearms 
Legislation and Effects on Homicide 1974 to 2008, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2303 (2012) 
(concluding that the data “failed to demonstrate a beneficial association between [firearms] 
legislation and firearm homicide rates between 1974 and 2008”). 
 123. See Evaluating Canada’s 1995 Firearm Legislation, supra note 122 and accompanying 
text. 
 124. See Jean Caron, Gun Control and Suicide: Possible Impact of Canadian Legislation to 
Ensure Safe Storage of Firearms, 8 Archives Suicide Res. 361, 374 (2004), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10/1080/13811110490476752 (finding a reduction in firearm 
suicides). 
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reducing violent crimes involving a firearm in Canada.
125
 The studies 
showing a decrease in the use of firearms in homicides tend to predate 
the implementation of the Firearms Act, but remain useful given that 
Canada progressively increased its regulation of gun ownership.
126
 One 
such study examined data, ranging from 1969–1985 and found Canada’s 
adoption of stricter firearms laws “[w]as associated with a decrease in the 
use of firearms for homicide but an increase in the use of all other 
methods for homicide.”
127
 However, examination of post-Firearms Act 
scholarly research suggests the implementation of the Canadian Firearms 
Act has not yielded the results members of parliament expected, which is 
not to say that the Firearms Act has been a failure. 
In a 2005 paper, Professor Gary Mauser examined “[t]he 
organizational problems of the [Canadian] firearms program and 
evaluate[d] its effectiveness in improving public safety.”
128
  Mauser’s 
first critique is focused on the cost of implementing the firearm 
registry.
129
 At first, Canadian lawmakers estimated implementing the 
registry would cost no more than $2 million—quite different than the $1 
billion the program actually cost.
130
 The increase in cost is attributable to 
the Canadian government underestimating the problems that would arise 
with the database, as well as the cost of running and maintaining such a 
large database.
131
 
The next logical question is whether the ends justified the means—
whether Canadian gun control improved public safety.
132
 Mauser 
analyzed Canadian crime statistics from 2003 and the various sub 
categories of reported incidents which were classified as “gun crimes.”
133
 
“Illegal possession of a weapon” (47%) and “other offensive weapons 
charges” (21%)
134
 accounted for the largest percentage of Canadian 
 
 125. See Sproule & Kennett, supra note 102, at 34 (stating that the use of firearms in Canadian 
homicides has declined since the implementation of strict gun control in 1976). 
 126. See, e.g., id. (studying data from 1972–1982, before the implementation of the CFA). 
 127. Id. (citing Antoon A. Leenaars & David Lester, Summary, Effects of Gun Control on 
Homicide in Canada, 75 PSYCHOL. REP. 81 (1994), http://www.amsciepub.com/doi/abs/10.2466/
pr0.1994.75.1.81 (by subscription)). 
 128. Evaluating Canada’s 1995 Firearm Legislation, supra note 122, at 1. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 3. 
 132. Id. at 8 (the stated purpose of the CFA was to “improve public safety”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. “Other offensive weapons charges” includes, for example, non-violent crimes under the 
Canadian Criminal Code such as Carrying a concealed weapon (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 90), 
Unauthorized possession of a firearm (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 91), and Carrying weapon while 
attending public meeting (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 89). 
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firearm crimes.
135
 Violent crimes such as robbery and homicide involving 
a firearm accounted for 18% and 1%, respectively, making up a much 
smaller percentage of the total gun crimes charged in Canada in 2003.
136
 
While the Canadian legislature did not expressly define the primary focus 
of its goal to “improve public safety” (i.e. curbing the use of firearms in 
violent crime), Mauser believes the most important goal of the CFA is to 
“reduce the overall level of criminal violence.”
137
 Mauser found that since 
the early 1990s, violent crime rates have remained relatively unchanged 
and seem to be unaffected since the implementation of the Firearms 
Act.
138
 Furthermore, Mauser found evidence of method substitution, 
where criminals use other weapons to commit violent crimes, after 
firearm restrictions were implemented.
139
 He also opines that “it is 
misleading and untrue to claim that gun death per se is central to public 
safety . . . [because] gun deaths [in Canada] are primarily suicides.”
140
 
For example, in 2001, there were 822 total gun deaths in Canada, 651 of 
which were suicides.
141
 In light of this information, Mauser states that 
“[i]n evaluating public safety, we need to avoid being misled by overly 
simple concepts like gun death,”
142
 which is “[t]oo heterogeneous to be 
useful in guiding policy.”
143
 Focusing specifically on homicide trends, 
the homicide rate in the United States is actually declining faster than in 
Canada.
144
 The Canadian homicide rate has remained relatively constant 
since at least two years prior to the implementation of the Firearms Act.
145
 
“[The Canadian homicide rate] was 31% in 1993, and 29% in 2003,” with 
the proportion involving firearms remaining constant over that same time 
period, around 24%.
146
 
 
 135. Id. at 8, table 1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 9; see also id. at 10 (the Justice Minister responsible for the Canadian Firearms Act 
“claimed that the reason for the gun registry was to save lives”). 
 138. Id. at 8–9. 
 139. Id.; see also Gary A. Mauser, Ten Myths About Firearms and Violence in Canada, 23 J. 
FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 76, 81 (2011) (“Over the past 10 years, firearms were involved in 
approximately as many homicides as knives”) [hereinafter Ten Myths About Firearms and Violence 
in Canada]. 
 140. Evaluating Canada’s 1995 Firearm Legislation, supra note 122, at 12, table 2. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 14. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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Based on his analysis of the pertinent data, Mauser believes the CFA 
has “failed to improve public safety or to save lives.”
147
 Alternatively, 
Mauser believes there are more effective ways to improve public 
safety.
148
 He suggests more cost-effective measures, such as increasing 
prison sentences for violent criminals, increasing court budgets, and 
improving immigration screening procedures to more effectively prohibit 
migrants with violent records.
149
 
In its brief to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National 
Security regarding Bill C-391, a measure to repeal the requirement to 
register non-restricted firearms, the Coalition for Gun Control 
(“Coalition”) offered a different perspective on some of the issues 
previously discussed by Mauser.
150
 The Coalition based its opposition to 
the bill on a number of premises citing: (1) declining rates of firearm 
death since the enactment of stricter firearms regulations; (2) the high 
costs of gun death and injury; and (3) meeting international obligations 
to combat the illegal gun trade.
151
 
In discussing “firearm death,” the Coalition primarily based its 
recommendations on the notable decline in suicide deaths involving a 
firearm.
152
 Contrary to Professor Mauser, who suggested that addressing 
suicide deaths in the gun control discussion distorts the statistics of 
homicide and violent crime involving firearms, the Coalition noted a 
relationship between suicide and homicide.
153
 “Risk factors for suicide 
and homicide are closely linked, consequently many homicides, 
including 50% of domestic homicides involving firearms, end in 
suicide.”
154
 The Coalition conceded that “establishing causal 
relationships between complex factors is difficult.”
155
 This concession 
 
 147. Evaluating Canada’s 1995 Firearm Legislation, supra note 122, at 84; see also Ten Myths 
About Firearms and Violence in Canada, supra note139, at 77, 91 (stating that targeting law 
abiding firearm owners is not an effective solution because, “the probability of a law abiding 
Canadian firearms owner committing murder is less than one-half that of the typical Canadian” and 
“There is no empirical support for the claim that stronger gun laws have helped reduce gun violence. 
In fact, the use of firearms in homicide has increased by 24% since the beginning of the long-gun 
registry”). 
 148. Evaluating Canada’s 1995 Firearm Legislation, supra note 122, at 16. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Discussion of Private Member’s Bill C-391: Brief to the Standing Committee on 
Public Safety and National Security, COALITION FOR GUN CONTROL (May 2010), http://
guncontrol.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CGC_Brief_C391final.pdf [hereinafter Coalition Brief 
to the Standing Committee]. 
 151. Id. at 5–6. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 3. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 5. 
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notwithstanding, it further stated that “[f]irearm deaths in Canada have 
declined with stricter controls on firearms . . . .”
156
 To support its 
proposition, the Coalition cited the decline in the number of Canadians 
killed with firearms over a period spanning from 3.8 per 100,000 in 1995 
to 2.45 per 100,00 in 2005,
157
 a decline which was admittedly “driven by 
a significant reduction in suicides with firearms.”
158
 The Coalition also 
noted a decrease in the number of murders with rifles and shotguns from 
0.21 per 100,000 in 1995 to 0.1 per 100,000 in 2008, as well as a decline 
in the number of robberies with firearms from 22 per 100,000 in 1995 to 
14 per 100,000 in 2008.
159
 
In addition to its discussion of firearm deaths, the Coalition also 
addressed the relative cost of the firearms registry and the international 
“norm to license gun owners and register firearms.”
160
 While it 
recognized the high cost and efficiency problems of maintaining the 
firearm registry, the Coalition stated that cost is “dwarfed by the costs of 
gun death and injury.”
161
 According to the Coalition, the savings from 
discontinuing the registration of unrestricted firearms would lead to an 
increase in the cost of police investigations and the costs associated with 
a theoretical increase in firearm-related injuries and deaths.
162
 It also 
referenced a report from the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey which 
found that the estimated decrease in gun injuries and deaths in Canada 
since 1995 “equals savings up to $1.4 billion Canadian dollars a year.”
163
 
Finally, the Coalition references international standards and policy 
developments surrounding gun control.
164
 “Canada’s gun control law has 
helped reduce the diversion of legal guns into illegal markets and is seen, 
by many, to be part of our obligation under specific international 
agreements as well as international human rights law.”
165
 
While the Coalition’s arguments and analysis offer a contrasting 
perspective to that of Professor Mauser, it represents a minority 
viewpoint that Canada’s firearms regulations have made a statistically 
significant impact on the prevention of violent crime involving firearms. 
 
 156. Coalition Brief to the Standing Committee, supra note 151, at 5. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 5–6. 
 159. Id. at 6. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 2. 
 162. Coalition Brief to the Standing Committee, supra note 151, at 6. 
 163. Id. (citing Small Arms Survey 2006, GRADUATE INST. INT’L STUD. GENEVA (Aug. 3, 
2006)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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3. Great Britain 
Great Britain has a long history of strict gun control policies which, 
similar to Australia, are often referenced by policymakers as a model for 
firearms regulations in the United States.
166
 The Firearms Act of 1968, 
which is currently the foundational piece of firearms legislation in 
Britain, was preceded by less comprehensive legislation dating back to 
1819-1820.
167
 For an extended period of time, the British Bill of Rights 
of 1688 was understood to protect the right of citizens to maintain arms, 
“which Parliament had no authority to breach in literal terms.”
168
 
Following the French revolutionary wars, thousands of unemployed 
soldiers returned to England and to poor economic conditions.
169
 In 
August 1819, after an extended period of worker protests and riots, 
Magistrates in the town of Manchester ordered the local militia members 
to open fire on a crowd that would not disperse.
170
 Dozens of people were 
killed and hundreds were wounded in the event, which came to be known 
as the Peterloo Massacre.
171
 In the months following the massacre, the 
British parliament passed a number of bills restricting individual liberties, 
among which was the Seizure of Arms Act.
172
 This act gave local justices 
of the peace broad power to “enter any place day or night . . . to search 
for and confiscate weapons kept for a purpose dangerous to the public 
peace,” based on the testimony of only a single witness.
173
 Lord 
Rancliffe, among others, voiced his deep concerns regarding the 
infringement on individual liberties authorized by the Seizure of Arms 
Act. 
The principles upon which it was founded, and the 
temper in which it was framed appeared to him to be so much 
at variance with the free spirit of their venerated constitution, 
and so contrary to that undoubted right which the subjects of 
this country had ever possessed—the right of retaining arms 
for defence of themselves, their families, and property—that he 
 
 166. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 89. 
 167. JOYCE L. MALCOLM, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE 94–95 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 2002). 
 168. COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, SECOND REPORT: CONTROLS OVER FIREARMS, 1999–
2000, H.C.95-II, App. 8, Part I, ¶ 2 (UK), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/
cmselect/cmhaff/95/95ap25.htm [hereinafter SECOND REPORT]. 
 169. MALCOLM, supra note 167, at 94–95. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 95. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 96 (internal quotations omitted). 
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could not look upon it without expressing his disapprobation 
and regret.174 
Following the Seizure of Arms Act, the right to keep arms was 
vigorously protected by Parliament into the 20th century.
175
 Despite a 
large population increase from 1751–1871,
176
 England was experiencing 
a tremendous decline in the rates of violent crime.
177
 However, 
Parliament was determined to enact more comprehensive restrictions on 
firearms, and in 1870 introduced the “Gun Licence Act,” which created 
a national gun registration system.
178
 During both World Wars, the 
British government believed armed civilians were necessary to the 
common defense and loosened the restrictions on firearms.
179
 However, 
during the periods following each respective world war, the British 
government subsequently tightened restrictions on firearms.
180
 “In time 
of peril the government turned readily to armed civilians for help. When 
danger passed and peace returned, it was determined to disarm those same 
civilians.”
181
 
In 1968, all the previously enacted firearms laws were consolidated 
and amended to comprise the Firearms Act.
182
 From 1968 to present day, 
the restrictions under the 1968 Act have been amended and increased, 
often in response to a tragic shooting.
183
 Today, the 1968 Act, and its 
contemporary amendments, include comprehensive requirements for 
obtaining a firearm certificate,
184
 safe storage and transport requirements 
for certificate holders, a total ban on purchasing or possessing a handgun, 
and strict prohibitions on the manufacturing, possession, purchase, and 
 
 174. MALCOLM, supra note 167, at 96–97. 
 175. SECOND REPORT, supra note 168, App. 8, Part I, ¶ 2. 
 176. See MALCOLM, supra note 167, at 116 (in 1751 there were around 6.5 million people in 
England. By 1871 the population had grown to 21.4 million).   
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 117–22. 
 179. Id. at 140, 156–63. 
 180. MALCOLM, supra note 167, at 140–41, 159–60. 
 181. Id. at 141. 
 182. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 90. 
 183. Id. at 90–93 (The Hungerford Massacre in 1988 where a lone gunman killed himself and 
sixteen others; the Dublane Massacre in 1997 where a lone gunman killed sixteen elementary 
school children; and Cumbria in 2010 where a lone gunman with lawfully possessed firearms killed 
twelve people and wounded twenty-five others). 
 184. Id. at 99 (Applicants must have two character references, be a British resident in good 
standing, and have a good reason for possessing, purchasing, or acquiring a firearm or ammunition. 
Applicants are also subject to a Medical history check which includes police checking with the 
applicant’s personal physician to determine if there is “evidence of alcoholism, drug abuse, or signs 
of personality disorder”). 
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sale of prohibited military style weapons.
185
 Once an applicant is granted 
a firearm certificate, which must be renewed every five years, the holder 
is subject to conditions of firearm ownership.
186
 Conditions include 
restrictions on the use of certain firearms (e.g. rifles may only be used for 
target shooting) and secure storage requirements.
187
 The conditions of 
ownership are strictly enforced.
188
 For example, in 2000, a Queen’s 
lawyer named Arthur Farrer had his certificate revoked after he told his 
mother where he stored his gun and the location of the keys to the 
cupboard.
189
 The Court of Appeal upheld the revocation despite the fact 
that Farrer’s mother had never handled guns nor had any interest in 
guns.
190
 
Firearm certificates may be revoked if the holder is “a danger to 
public safety; of intemperate habits; of unsound mind; unfit to be 
entrusted with such a firearm; a prohibited person under the Firearms Act; 
or no longer has ‘good reason’ for possession.”
191
 The police provide 
detailed guidance on how the terms should be construed or interpreted. 
For instance, the category of “intemperate habits” includes “evidence of 
alcohol or drug abuse; aggressive or antisocial behavior . . . or hostility 
towards a group of people.”
192
 Other categorical criteria include 
determining whether the certificate holder has any criminal convictions 
or involvement in criminal activities, or whether the individual has been 
subject to any period of detention under the Mental Health Act.
193
  
Similarly, convictions for crimes such as drunk driving have been upheld 
as being valid grounds for revocation or denial.
194
 
In addition to the pre- and post-certificate requirements and 
conditions, strictly enforced criminal penalties and minimum sentencing 
guidelines are an integral aspect of Britain’s firearm regulatory 
structure.
195
 For example, a conviction for unlawfully possessing a 
firearm carries a mandatory minimum five-year sentence.
196
 
 
 185. Id. at 99 (Military style weapons include, but are not limited to, any firearm that is capable 
of firing missiles, any self-loading rifled gun chambered for a caliber exceeding .22, and any 
weapon with a self-contained gas cartridge system). 
 186. Id. at 100. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 100. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 101. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 102. 
 194. Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, supra note 1, at 101. 
 195. Id. at 105–6. 
 196. Id. at 106. 
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a. Impact and Statistical Efficacy of Great Britain’s Firearm Regulations 
Due to the lengthy history of British firearms regulations, analyzing 
the criminal statistics maintained by the British government is not an easy 
task due to the “mass of primary and secondary legislation”
197
 that 
comprises the contemporary system of British firearm regulations.
198
 In 
a Memorandum to an inquiry by the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Home Affairs in 1999–2000, Mr. Colin Greenwood noted 
encountering these issues in his analysis.
199
 One example of the 
complexity underlying the statistics is that the term “firearm” is “all 
embracing and includes imitations, airguns, and ‘supposed’ firearms.”
200
 
Additionally, the firearm offenses recorded by the police include damage 
exceeding £20, the real value of which has reduced over the years.
201
 “A 
broken window which cost £10 to replace in 1980 would cost £24.40 to 
replace in 1998 and so would be recorded in the statistics if it was broken 
by a ‘firearm.’”
202
 Due to this complexity, when analyzing raw data from 
the British police, it is impossible to know whether an entry recorded as 
an “offense in which a firearm was used” was a homicide or a teenager 
breaking a window with a pellet gun.
203
 Nevertheless, Greenwood was 
able to conduct a time series analysis of data for robberies and homicides 
involving firearms from 1969-1997.
204
 Greenwood stated: 
All the evidence that can be found from these sources 
shows that when there were no controls on firearms the rate of 
armed crime was very low and it remained so until the mid 
1960s when it began to escalate. But the rate of legal firearms 
ownership was declining and has continued to decline whilst 
the rate of armed crime has grown.
205
 
Analysis of the pertinent data led Greenwood to conclude that 
statistical evidence shows that extending the regulations on legally owned 
firearms is unlikely to reduce the rate of violent crimes involving a 
firearm.
206
 In their submission to the same committee inquiry, Kate 
Broadhurst and Professor John Benyon—members of the Scarman 
 
 197. SECOND REPORT, supra note 168, App. 8, Part I, ¶ 119. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. App. 8, Part II, ¶ 18. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at App. 8, Part II, ¶ 16. 
 202. Id. 
 203. SECOND REPORT, supra note 169, App. 8, Part I, ¶ 18. 
 204. Id. at App. 8, Part II, ¶¶ 25–27. 
 205. Id. at App. 8, Part II,¶ 15. 
 206. Id. at App. 8, Part II, ¶ 100. 
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Center at the University of Leicester—reached the same conclusion as 
Greenwood.
207
 
Due to the lack of comparative research in Europe on the issue of 
gun control, Broadhurst and Benyon were commissioned to conduct a 
two-year study of the different gun-control regimes in the European 
Union and surrounding countries.
208
 Broadhurst and Benyon found that 
because violent crimes like robbery and homicide rarely involve legally 
owned firearms, “further bans on guns are unlikely to bring about 
reductions in gun-related crime.”
209
 From 1982–1997, the number of 
homicides involving a firearm peaked at seventy-seven in 1987, but 
remained relatively steady on average.
210
 However, the category of “other 
violence against persons” involving firearms, which accounts for a large 
majority of firearm crime over the time period (average of 1,900 offenses 
per year), 64% of the crimes were committed with air weapons—BB guns 
or pellet guns.
211
 “In 1997, the Home Office figures for England and 
Wales revealed that 7,506 [firearm] offenses out of the total of 12,410 
(60%) involved air weapons.”
212
 Thus, air weapons make up the majority 
of the overall statistics of firearm usage in crimes.
213
 Given that air 
weapons are typically used in crimes involving property damage, the 
above statistic is particularly troubling because it inflates the total number 
of firearm crimes. That statistic is somewhat misleading, especially if the 
goal of firearms regulation is to reduce violent crimes and homicides. 
In the 2010–2011 session of the House of Commons, the Home 
Affairs Committee released its third report on Firearms Control.
214
 In its 
report, the Committee recognized that it is, “difficult to form an accurate 
assessment [about the extent to which firearms regulations have had an 
effect on crime], given the limitations of available data.”
215
 However, 
after hearing “contrasting views” the Committee determined “[t]here is 
considerable evidence, although it is not clear cut, that well-designed 
legislation to regulate and restrict the legal supply of firearms can reduce 
gun crime.”
216
 The committee’s recommendation was based in part on 
 
 207. Id. at App. 11, ¶ 4.1. 
 208. Id. at App. 11, ¶ 2.2. 
 209. SECOND REPORT, supra note 169, at App. 11, ¶ 4.1. 
 210. Id. at App. 11, ¶ 4.6. 
 211. Id. at App. 11, ¶ 4.9. 
 212. Id. at App. 11, ¶ 5.1. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD REPORT: CONTROLS OVER FIREARMS, 2010–
2011, H.C. 447-I (UK), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/
447/447i.pdf [hereinafter THIRD REPORT]. 
 215. Id. at 56, ¶ 2. 
 216. Id. at 19, ¶ 35. 
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testimony by Professor Squires who countered the statistical 
ineffectiveness of the current regulations
217
 by cautioning the use of 
official statistics due to flaws in the reporting and recording of crimes 
involving firearms.
218
 Squires argued that “there are approximately fifty-
five types of offenses that can be committed before a weapon is pointed 
at anyone . . .”  and “estimates suggest that the total UK gun crime figure 
would rise by as much as 60%” if those offenses were documented.
219
 
Additionally, Squires argued that previous research has indicated that 
very serious firearms crimes, such as attempted murder, may not be 
reported.
220
 The Committee also heard “moving evidence” from 
individuals who had been affected by gun crime.
221
 Ultimately, the 
Committee concluded the following: 
On the basis of data submitted to the Cullen Inquiry, and 
that collected more recently by Professor Squires and the Gun 
Control Network, we are concerned about the use of legal 
firearms in domestic incidences . . . . [T]he UK has strict gun 
laws and comparatively low levels of gun crime. The link 
should not be overstated—there is no direct correlation in 
recent UK history between levels of gun ownership and gun 
crime trends. However, it is fair to assume at least in part that 
this demonstrates the success of the licensing regime . . . which 
enables authorities to satisfy themselves that those owning 
firearms are fit to do so.222 
In conclusion, the statistical evidence related to the effectiveness of 
British firearms regulation remains contested. However, the majority of 
evidence seems to suggest that, at the very least, British firearms 
regulations have not had a statistically significant effect on the rates of 
violent crimes involving firearms. 
 
 217. James Slack, Culture of Violence: Gun Crime Goes Up by 89% In A Decade, DAILY MAIL, 
Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article (A 2009 government report showed, “the 
total number of firearm offences in England and Wales . . . increased from 5,209 in 1998/99 to 
9,865 [in 2008/09] – a rise of 89[%].” Furthermore, “[t]he number of people injured or killed by 
guns . . . has increased from 864 in 1998/99 to a provisional figure of 1,760 in 2008/09, an increase 
of 104[%]”). 
 218. THIRD REPORT, supra note 214, at 8, ¶ 8. 
 219. Id. (“what gets recorded in the criminal statistics by the Home Office is only the criminal 
misuse of firearms . . . even simple illegal possession of a firearm which . . . attracts a five-year 
penalty, is not recorded as gun crime in the Home Office data.”). 
 220. Id. at 9, ¶ 9. 
 221. Id. at 9, ¶ 11. 
 222. Id. at 56–57, ¶¶ 2, 4 (emphasis added). 
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PART III: DETERMINING A SECOND AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
After examining the representative statistics on the efficacy of 
firearms regulations in Australia, Canada, and Great Britain in Part II, 
one thing is clear—it remains difficult for scholars to reach a consensus 
regarding the statistical results of gun control. The complexity and lack 
of consensus in this area should, in itself, guide the process for 
determining a standard of review to apply to Second Amendment 
challenges in the United States. Once a court determines that the law at 
bar burdens the conduct protected by the Second Amendment, it must 
then choose which standard of review it will apply to determine whether 
the infringement is constitutionally permissible.
223
 Current constitutional 
standards of review such as the rational basis test, intermediate scrutiny, 
or strict scrutiny are not adequately suited to review Second Amendment 
challenges due to the unique governmental and constitutional interests at 
stake.
224
 The governmental objectives present in every Second 
Amendment case—public safety interests and violence prevention—will 
always satisfy the “government interest” prong
225
 of any of the current 
tests. This section will examine the standards of review under which post-
Heller appellate courts have reviewed the Second Amendment 
challenges, the difficulties that courts and legal scholars have faced in 
choosing a standard of review, and whether any of the current 
constitutional standards of review provide sufficient framework for 
courts to address the unique interests raised in Second Amendment 
challenges. This note submits that the current constitutional standards of 
review are not sufficiently designed so as to address the unique nature of 
Second Amendment challenges and that the Court should adopt a new 
and pragmatic form of scrutiny for reviewing Second Amendment 
challenges. 
 
 
 
 
 223. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 224. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, S., dissenting) (suggesting the Court adopt an interest-
balancing inquiry rather than any current constitutional standard of review because of “[t]he fact 
that important interests lie on both sides of the constitutional equation . . . review of gun-control 
regulation is not a context in which a court should effectively presume either constitutionality (as 
in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality (as in strict scrutiny).”). 
 225. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 18.3(a)(ii) (the rational basis test requires the 
government to have a “legitimate” purpose for imposing the law); id. at § 18.3(a)(iv) (intermediate 
scrutiny requires an “important” governmental interest); id. at § 18.3(a)(iii) (strict scrutiny requires 
a “compelling” governmental interest). 
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A. Traditional Levels of Scrutiny  
in Post-Heller Second Amendment Challenges 
To better understand the need for adopting the proposed form of 
pragmatic scrutiny, one must examine the applicability of the traditional 
levels of scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges. The language used 
by the Supreme Court when it held that the right granted by the Second 
Amendment is a “pre-existing . . . fundamental right”
226
 makes it clear 
that the right for an individual to keep and bear arms is within a category 
of fundamental rights granted by the Constitution
227
 that are entitled to 
the highest level of protection.
228
 It logically follows that Second 
Amendment challenges should be reviewed subject to a form of 
heightened scrutiny under which other fundamental rights that are part of 
this category are reviewed.
229
 Strict scrutiny remains the standard of 
review most often applied to challenges involving fundamental 
constitutional rights which must be protected against government 
infringement.
230
 For example, strict scrutiny is almost always applied to 
those rights protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, such as when “a governmental act classifies people in terms 
of their ability to exercise a fundamental right.”
231
 Strict scrutiny is also 
applied to the review of legislation limiting fundamental constitutional 
rights protected under the due process guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment.
232
 The application of strict scrutiny to legislation limiting 
the rights protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, ensures that 
these rights will be given the highest level of constitutional protection, 
unless the law burdening the right is narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest.
233
 In other words, if a compelling 
governmental interest exists, the government must construct the law in a 
 
 226. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–93. 
 227. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1149 (Bea, C., concurring). 
 228. Id. (citing United States v. Engstrum, 609 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2009) (applying 
strict scrutiny “because Heller classified the Second Amendment right alongside the First and 
Fourth Amendments which are traditionally analyzed under strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
 229. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1149 (Bea, C., concurring). See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, 
supra note 10, at §18.3(a)(iii) (“Under the due process guarantee, the Court often employs strict 
scrutiny . . . in reviewing legislation which limits fundamental constitutional rights. However, the 
Court will also use this standard of review under the equal protection guarantee . . . when the 
governmental act classifies people in terms of exercising a fundamental right . . . [and] when the 
governmental classification distinguishes between persons, in terms of any right, upon some 
‘suspect’ basis . . . .”). 
 230. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 18.3. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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way that it imposes the least possible burden on the protected right in the 
course of achieving that interest.
234
 Professor Joyce Malcolm, 
recognizing the traditional connection between the application of strict 
scrutiny and challenges involving fundamental constitutional rights,
235
 
has noted that “fundamental rights are not to be separated into first and 
second class status; the strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment 
freedom of the press and freedom of speech should also be applied to 
Second Amendment rights.”
236
 
An analysis of relevant case law and a variety of commentary 
discussing the Second Amendment standard of review, shows that lower 
courts in the post-Heller era have had difficulty choosing and/or applying 
traditional levels of scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges.
237
 The 
majority of lower courts and legal scholars have concluded that strict 
scrutiny is not a viable standard of review for Second Amendment 
challenges because laws reviewed under strict scrutiny are presumptively 
unconstitutional and rarely upheld.
238
 Thus, if strict scrutiny were to be 
adopted, a large number of current firearm regulations would be deemed 
unconstitutional and state legislatures would be faced with limited 
options to address issues of public safety, which involve regulating 
firearms.
239
 A distinct minority has argued that most governmental 
regulations burdening conduct protected by the Second Amendment 
would not only be able to survive strict scrutiny, but should be required 
to survive strict scrutiny.
240
  Indeed, proponents of this argument claim 
that in Second Amendment cases where intermediate scrutiny was 
applied, the challenged regulation likely would have survived strict 
scrutiny due to predominating governmental objective to protect the lives 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 2, at 102, 103. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE  (Mar. 31, 
2015), http://www.smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/the-second-amendment/post-heller-litigation-
summary. 
 238. See, e.g., Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 469 (noting that the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits have all either adopted an approach based on the conduct being regulated, similar to 
First Amendment standards of review, or employed a level of scrutiny less than strict (arguably 
intermediate) but allowing for the future imposition of strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny 
depending on the circumstances). 
 239. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An 
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1468–70 (2009). 
 240. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1149 (Bea, C., concurring) (“scholarly analysis shows that federal 
courts uphold around thirty percent of the laws they analyze under strict scrutiny . . . [m]oreover, 
federal courts uphold Congressional statutes under strict scrutiny about half the time.”) (citation 
omitted). 
FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2017  7:45 AM 
252 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:2 
of citizens.
241
 Furthermore, with proper attention to detail, the law can 
surely be narrowly tailored to meet that objective. In a survey of all 
Second Amendment cases reviewed under strict scrutiny, Tina Mehr and 
Professor Adam Winkler found that none of the regulations at bar were 
invalidated despite being reviewed under Strict Scrutiny.
242
 Because 
there is always a compelling objective present, public safety, the central 
question is whether firearm regulations should be required to meet strict 
scrutiny’s “narrow tailoring” standard or intermediate scrutiny’s 
“substantial relationship” standard.  
Judge Carlos Bea, in his concurring opinion in United States v. 
Chovan, argued for a similar approach when he acknowledged that 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)—”prohibit[ing] persons convicted of domestic 
violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms for life” 
243
—would 
have survived strict scrutiny despite the majority electing to apply 
intermediate scrutiny.
244
 Judge Bea argued for the application of strict 
scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges by analogizing Second 
Amendment challenges to those raised in freedom of association cases 
“often involv[ing] governmental action that restricts association based on 
the status or conduct of the individuals, just as § 922(g)(9) restricts the 
right to keep and bear arms for particular persons based on their status 
and previous conduct.”
245
 He further stated that “[i]n both cases […] this 
governmental action is often directed towards preventing violence and 
preserving public safety.”
246
 Chovan is just one example supporting the 
argument that, despite the majority electing to apply intermediate 
scrutiny, the law at bar likely would have survived, and arguably should 
have been subject to, strict scrutiny. The line of reasoning employed by 
the majority in Chovan, and most other circuits, fosters inconsistency in 
Second Amendment jurisprudence, which, in Heller, prompted Justice 
Scalia to cast aside any notion of an interest-balancing inquiry, writing 
that “[a] constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of 
its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”
247
 
 
 241. Id. at 1150; see also Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, The Standardless Second Amendment, 
AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y L. & POL’Y 4 (Oct. 2010), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/
default/files/Mehr_and_Winkler_Standardless_Second_Amendment.pdf. 
 242. See Mehr & Winkler, supra note 243, at 4, 6. 
 243. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1129–30. 
 244. Id. at 1150 (Bea, C., concurring) (stating that “based on the data the majority discuss in 
detail, the government interest in public safety and preventing gun violence is sufficiently 
compelling and narrowly tailored to satisfy those prongs of strict scrutiny analysis”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
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Yet, notwithstanding the arguments in favor of applying strict 
scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges, most circuits have adopted 
the application of intermediate scrutiny.
248
 One predominating reason is 
that, given the usual nature of the governmental interest at stake in 
Second Amendment challenges,
249
 many circuits have recognized that 
applying strict scrutiny might cause some types of gun control regulations 
to fail, which could potentially result in lives being lost at the hands of 
citizens who are subsequently entitled to own or carry a firearm.
250
 
Taking into account the governmental interest at bar, these circuits have 
been reluctant to apply the more draconian standard of strict scrutiny to 
Second Amendment cases.
251
 In United States v. Masciandaro, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the regulation in 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b)—prohibiting loaded 
firearms from being carried in a motor vehicle in national park areas—
did substantially burden Masciandaro’s Second Amendment right.
252
 In 
reaching its holding, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to § 
2.4(b), aiding the court to reach its final determination that the 
government had a substantial interest in protecting the safety of park 
visitors—often times families with small children—and that § 2.4(b) was 
reasonably adapted to serve that interest.
253
 In choosing intermediate 
scrutiny, the court compared the Second Amendment right to commercial 
speech and its “subordinate position” relative to other categories of 
speech.
254
 The court further added that “[if we were] to require strict 
scrutiny in circumstances such as those presented here, we would likely 
foreclose an extraordinary number of regulatory measures, thus 
handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to ‘prevent[ ] armed mayhem’ in public 
places . . . .”
255
 The Fourth Circuit seems to suggest that by subjecting 
laws limiting Second Amendment rights to strict scrutiny, the court’s 
 
 248. See generally Anderson, supra note 8; Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal 
Uncertainty: What’s A Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2012). 
Cf. Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Dept., 775 F.3d 308, 328–29 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 
837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that “[other] circuits have generally applied intermediate 
scrutiny in Second Amendment challenges”). 
 249. i.e., the safety and security of the public. 
 250. See, e.g., Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471 (stating “were we to require strict scrutiny in 
circumstances such as those presented here, we would likely foreclose an extraordinary number of 
regulatory measures, thus handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to ‘prevent[ ] armed mayhem’ in public 
places . . . .”); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1135 (noting that the Seventh Circuit has applied intermediate 
scrutiny because there is arguably a high association with firearms causing injury or death in 
domestic situations). 
 251. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471. 
 252. Id. at 460. 
 253. Id. at 473–74. 
 254. Id. at 471 (citing Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)). 
 255. Id. 
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decision, in some cases, would result in the upheaval of gun control 
regulations, possibly giving way to violence at places like national parks. 
However, keeping the aforementioned in mind, it must be noted that 
despite both parties in Masciandaro questioning whether the disputed 
area in their case
256
 was one of the “sensitive places” referenced by 
Justice Scalia in Heller,
257
 the Fourth Circuit Court declined to address 
the issue, stating that “even if Dangerfield Island is not a sensitive 
place . . . § 2.4(b) still passes constitutional muster under the intermediate 
scrutiny standard.”
258
 If the court had addressed whether the area where 
Masciandaro had parked his vehicle was a sensitive area, the court’s 
opinion may have been more easily reconciled with Heller. 
Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Masciandaro, other 
commentators have argued against the application of strict scrutiny by 
suggesting relatively violent hypotheticals that involve death or 
destruction, seemingly in an effort to draw attention to the possible 
consequences of protecting Second Amendment rights over upholding 
laws targeting gun control.
259
 Professor Lawrence Rosenthal, as part of a 
discussion on gun regulations in the city of Chicago, has suggested that 
the Court’s ruling in Heller “seems to clinch the case for a right of gang 
members and drug dealers to carry firearms.”
260
 In his view, crime rates 
and the incidences of gang violence in Chicago would increase 
dramatically as a result of gun control efforts being overturned in favor 
of protecting a group of citizens’ Second Amendment rights.
261
 
According to Professor Rosenthal, a vigorous conception of the Second 
Amendment could “enable urban street gangs to act as occupying 
armies,”
262
 committing murders and other gun-related crimes at an 
exceedingly high rate.
263
 However, according to Professor Rosenthal, 
violence could still be curbed by enacting strict gun control regulations 
 
 256. Specifically, Masciandaro argued a parking area along a public highway was not within 
the national park area. 
 257. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 258. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473. 
 259. See generally Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 2 (Professor Rosenthal’s uses violent 
hyperbole throughout his discussion of the Second Amendment standard of review); Adam Liptak, 
Supreme Court Gun Ruling Doesn’t Block Proposed Controls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, 
http://nyti.ms/TvzxGO (discussing the effect of the Heller and McDonald holdings on gun control 
after the school shooting in Newtown, Conn.); Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 237 
(commenting on the Post-Heller judicial landscape, and the emerging jurisprudential patterns 
related to Second Amendment challenges). 
 260. Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 2, at 443. 
 261. See id. 
 262. Id. at 442. 
 263. Id. 
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in cities like Chicago and ensuring that these regulations will not be 
subject to strict scrutiny.
264
 
The method utilized by Professor Rosenthal and the Fourth Circuit, 
in an effort to address those who favor the adoption of strict scrutiny, 
finds success by using hyperbole such as “urban street gangs acting as 
occupying armies”
265
 or a failure to prevent “armed mayhem in public 
places,”
266
 to draw attention to the possible consequences of adopting 
strict scrutiny as the Second Amendment standard of review. Such 
hyperbole is common when it comes to discussing the Second 
Amendment, which further illustrates the polarizing nature of Second 
Amendment issues and the difficulty of balancing the competing interests 
present on both sides of the argument. However, a large volume of studies 
and data exist which contradict the alleged efficacy of gun control 
regulations and cast doubt upon the violent hypotheticals advanced by 
Professor Rosenthal and, to an extent, the Fourth Circuit.
267
 For example, 
the number of murders involving the use of firearms in Chicago in 
2010—a year in which the city strictly enforced stringent gun laws and 
“stop and frisk tactics”
268
—”equaled the number of American soldiers 
killed during the same period in Afghanistan and Iraq together.”
269
 Even 
government commissioned studies by the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences and the notoriously anti-gun U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
have “failed to identify any gun control that had reduced violent crime, 
suicide, or gun accidents.”
270
 Recent data from the Pew Research Center 
also reveals that the gun homicide rate is down forty-nine percent since 
1993,
271
 while another study shows that law enforcement efforts and 
firearms education programs have proved more effective at reducing gun 
violence than many of the gun control regulations discussed in this 
note.
272
 The disagreement among courts and scholars, and the hyperbolic 
arguments often associated with the Second Amendment, underscores the 
 
 264. Id. at 456–57. 
 265. Id. at 457. 
 266. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471. 
 267. See Margaret Weigel, Law and Policies That Attempt to Reduce Gun Violence, Journalist’s 
Resource (Mar. 7, 2013); Margot Sanger-Katz, Gun Deaths Are Mostly Suicides, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
8, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/upshot/gun-deaths-are-mostly-suicides.html?_r=0. 
 268. Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 2, at 441. 
 269. Id. at 457. 
 270. Kates & Mauser, supra note15, at 654 (citing Charles F. Wellford et al., Firearms and 
Violence: A Critical Review, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 6–10 (2004); Task Force on Community 
Preventative Services, First Reports Evaluating the Effectiveness of Strategies for Preventing 
Violence: Firearms Laws, 52 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY. REP. (RR-14 
RECOMMENDATIONS & REP.) 11, 16 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5214.pdf. 
 271. Weigel, supra note 269. 
 272. Id. 
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difficulty lower courts have encountered in determining which standard 
of review should apply to Second Amendment challenges. 
B. Interest-Balancing Inquiry 
Although the Heller majority expressly rejected Justice Breyer’s 
proposed interest-balancing inquiry,
273
 reviewing the approach is 
informative for two reasons. First, given the unexpected passing of 
Justice Scalia in February 2016, the composition of the Court will change, 
which could affect how the Court approaches Second Amendment issues 
in the future. Second, Justice Breyer raises a number of important issues 
in his dissent such as the applicability of traditional constitutional 
standards of review to Second Amendment challenges
274
 and the role 
played by empirical data in Second Amendment challenges.
275
 
One of Justice Breyer’s main contentions in his Heller dissent is that 
the majority erred by not choosing a standard of review to be applied to 
Second Amendment challenges.
276
 In Heller the Respondent urged the 
Court to adopt strict scrutiny as the standard of review,
277
 while the 
Petitioners suggested a “reasonableness test.”
278
 In discussing the 
Respondent’s proposal of strict scrutiny, Justice Breyer took the position 
that the majority implicitly rejects strict scrutiny “by broadly approving 
a set of laws—prohibitions on concealed carry weapons, forfeiture by 
criminals of the Second Amendment right . . .—whose constitutionality 
under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear.”
279
 Justice Breyer 
further commented that adopting strict scrutiny would be “impossible” 
because there is always a compelling state interest in Second Amendment 
cases.
280
 “Thus, any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny . . . will in 
 
 273. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 274. Heller, 554 U.S. at 687–89 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 275. Id. at 691, 694–96. 
 276. Id. at 687 (stating: “I therefore begin by asking a process-based question: How is a court 
to determine whether a particular firearm regulation . . . is consistent with the Second 
Amendment?” and “The majority is wrong when it says that the District’s law is unconstitutional 
‘[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.’” 
(alteration in original)). 
 277. See Initial Brief of Appellee-Respondent at 79–81, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 141. 
 278. See Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 69–74, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 7 (stating that “governments may impose 
‘reasonable restrictions’ on the exercise of any Second Amendment right. The United States 
[Solicitor General] agrees that ‘reasonable restrictions designed to prevent possession by unfit 
persons or to restrict the possession of types of firearms that are particularly suited to criminal 
misuse’ are constitutional.”). 
 279. Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 280. Id. at 689. 
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practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests 
protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental 
public-safety concerns on the other . . . .”
281
 Where complex interests lie 
on both sides of constitutional questions, “the Court generally asks 
whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent 
that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other 
important governmental interests.”
282
 Justice Breyer’s approach would 
“defer[] to a legislature’s empirical judgments . . . [because] a legislature 
is likely to have greater expertise and greater institutional factfinding [sic] 
capacity.”
283
 Justice Breyer also pointed out the Court’s lack of prior 
experience as a reason for giving a certain degree of deference to 
legislative judgements.
284
 
After outlining the framework of his interest-balancing inquiry, 
Justice Breyer proceeded to examine “the facts as the legislature saw 
them when it adopted the District statute.”
285
 The local council committee 
that recommended adopting the District statute in 1976 cited, “‘startling 
statistics’ regarding gun-related crime, accidents, and deaths, focusing 
particularly on the relation between handguns and crime and the 
proliferation of handguns within the District.”
286
 The Committee Report 
further referenced the high number of murders committed by “previously 
law-abiding citizens, in situations where spontaneous violence is 
generated by anger, passion or intoxication . . . ,”
287
 and statistics 
showing a strong correlation between handguns and crime.
288
  Justice 
Breyer then looked at contemporary statistics, which were gathered from 
the Petitioner’s briefs in their amici.
289
 These statistics included studies 
pertaining to firearm-related deaths in the United States,
290
 firearm-
related injuries,
291
 the relationship between handguns and firearm-related 
 
 281. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 282. Id. at 689–90. 
 283. Id. at 690. 
 284. Id. at 690–91. 
 285. Heller, 554 U.S. at 693 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 286. Id. at 694 (citing Firearm Control Regulations Act of 1975 (Council Act No. 1-142), 
Hearing and Disposition before the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess., on H. Con. Res. 694, Ser. No. 94-24, p. 25 (1976)). 
 287. Id. at 694. 
 288. Id. at 695. 
 289. Id. at 696. 
 290. Id. (citing a Dept. of Justice study ranging from 1993–1997, finding that of the total 
firearm-related deaths, 51% were suicides, 44% were homicides, 3% were accidents, and another 
2% were attributed to either legal interventions or undetermined causes). 
 291. Heller, 554 U.S. at 696–97 (Breyer, S., dissenting) (of firearm-related injuries, “62% 
resulted from assault, 17% were unintentional, 6% were suicide attempts, 1% were legal 
interventions, and 13% were of unknown causes”). 
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deaths and injuries,
292
 the prevalence of handgun use among criminals,
293
 
and the higher rate of firearm-related deaths and injuries in urban areas 
compared to rural areas.
294
 The Respondent and his amici did not always 
disagree with the figures submitted by the Petitioner, but rather argued 
the handgun ban would not help solve the crime and accident problems 
on which it was intended to affect.
295
 Among the statistics cited by the 
Respondent and his amici, were studies showing an increase in violent 
crime in the District,
296
 studies analyzing the effect of strict gun laws in 
twenty European countries—as well as some domestic studies—showing 
that “strict gun laws are correlated with more murders. . . ,”
297
 evidence 
that firearm ownership has been proven to have a beneficial effect for 
self-defense,
298
 and lastly, that “evidence suggests that [laws 
criminalizing gun possession] will have the effect only of restricting law-
abiding citizens, but not criminals, from acquiring guns.”
299
 
Drawing upon the legislative history of the District’s ban and the 
statistical evidence presented by the Petitioners, Respondent, and their 
respective amici, Justice Breyer determined that while Respondent’s 
evidence may have been “enough to convince many legislatures . . . not 
to adopt total handgun bans . . . . [T]he question here is whether they are 
strong enough to destroy judicial confidence in the reasonableness of a 
legislature that rejects them.”
300
 Justice Breyer did not discount any of 
the statistics or facts presented by the Respondent, such as the fact that 
crime increased subsequent to the ban, but rather determined that “after 
it does not mean because of it.”
301
 Justice Breyer reached the ultimate 
conclusion that the studies presented by the Respondent “do not by 
 
 292. Id. at 697–98 (“From 1993-1997, 81% of firearm-homicide victims were killed by 
handgun . . . . In the same period, for the 41% of firearm injuries for which the weapon type is 
known, 82% of them were from handguns.”). 
 293. Id. at 698 (“In a 1997 survey of inmates who were armed during the crime for which they 
were incarcerated, 83.2% of state inmates and 86.7% of federal inmates said they were armed with 
a handgun.”). 
 294. Id. at 698–99 (“the linkage of handguns to firearm deaths and injuries appears to be much 
stronger in urban than in rural areas”). 
 295. Id. at 699. 
 296. Id. at 699–700 (Justice Breyer stating: “Indeed, a comparison with 49 other major cities 
reveals that the District’s homicide rate is actually substantially higher relative to [] other cities 
than it was before the handgun restriction went into effect.”). 
 297. Heller, 554 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 298. Id. at 700–01 (“one study estimated that there were 2.2-to-2.5 million defensive uses of 
guns (mostly brandishing, about a quarter involving the actual firing of a gun) annually.”). 
 299. Id. at 701 (citing Brief for President Pro Tempore of Senate of Pennsylvania as Amicus 
Curiae at 35, 36, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 182). 
 300. Id. at 702. 
 301. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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themselves show that [the legislature’s predictive judgments] are 
incorrect,” but merely controversial. At the conclusion of his interest-
balancing inquiry, Justice Breyer ultimately determined the handgun ban 
and the governmental interests which it purported to serve, did not 
“disproportionately burden Amendment-protected interests[].”
302
 
Justice Breyer correctly observes in his Heller dissent, that applying 
any of the current heightened scrutiny standards to Second Amendment 
challenges necessarily turns into an interest-balancing inquiry.
303
 Indeed, 
Justice Breyer’s opinion highlights the very complex nature of the 
competing interests in Second Amendment challenges, which are very 
different than other constitutional challenges that are reviewed under 
either one of the traditional standards of means-end scrutiny. Attempts to 
apply either of the traditional levels of scrutiny to Second Amendment 
challenges becomes a futile exercise in semantics rather than a 
substantive analysis of the constitutionality of the law at bar. And, while 
Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing inquiry would, in theory, address 
many of the issues underlying review of Second Amendment challenges 
subject to either of the traditional standards, it is a freestanding approach 
with very little framework to guide lower courts evaluating Second 
Amendment challenges. Adopting Justice Breyer’s approach might very 
well lead to further division among the circuit courts. The fact is, judges 
are likely to have different views regarding the sufficiency of legislative 
inquiries or whether the statute’s benefit to public safety is proportional 
to the burden it places on the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding 
citizens. Thus, adopting an interest-balancing inquiry would do little to 
remedy the current inconsistencies in Second Amendment jurisprudence, 
or the difficulty lower courts have encountered in their review of Second 
Amendment challenges. This note proposes a new standard of review 
which would provide a degree of judicial discretion through the 
incorporation of certain aspects of Justice Breyer’s test, while also 
providing a sufficient framework to guide lower courts through the 
complexities of Second Amendment challenges. 
C. A Pragmatic Test for Second Amendment Challenges 
In challenges involving a constitutional right, “the government 
cannot rely on speculation or conjecture to support the government 
interest.”
304
 The form of scrutiny proposed herein would bridge the gap 
 
 302. Id. at 706–14 (emphasis in original). 
 303. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 304. Mance v. Holder, 74 F.Supp.3d 795, 810 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 
(1993)). 
FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2017  7:45 AM 
260 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:2 
between intermediate and strict scrutiny, while also incorporating some 
aspects of Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach. Under this 
pragmatic test, the government would bear the initial burden to make a 
“showing”
305
 that (1) there is a verifiable basis for the imposition of the 
law; and (2) that the law is specifically adapted
306
 so as to avoid 
unnecessary
307
 collateral infringement on the Second Amendment rights 
of law-abiding citizens. The required strength of the government’s 
“showing” would be determined based on a sliding scale under which the 
court would weigh factors such as the specificity of the law at bar, the 
type of restriction,
308
 the degree to which the law burdens constitutionally 
protected conduct, and whether, in the words of Justice Breyer, “there are 
practical less burdensome ways of furthering [the governmental] 
interests.”
309
 For example, broad, categorical, or indiscriminate 
restrictions would require a “substantial showing,”
310
 while restrictions 
drafted with a certain degree of specificity as to the conduct or class of 
individuals which it would affect, would only require a “reasonable 
showing.” Once the court has determined the strength of showing the 
government must make, it would then proceed to determine whether the 
law at bar satisfies the two-pronged test. 
The framework for this pragmatic test is based in part upon the 
“showing” of empirical evidence adopted by Judge Posner and the 
Seventh Circuit.
311
 Reviewing Second Amendment challenges subject to 
this pragmatic test would ensure the Second Amendment right is not 
unnecessarily regulated or restricted to accomplish a goal that is either 
statistically improbable or overly broad in nature. The incrementalism by 
 
 305. Showing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining showing as “the act or an 
instance of establishing through evidence and argument.”) Showing, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (Philip B. Gove et al. eds., 2002) 
(defining showing as “[P]erformance in a test of skill or power or of comparative effectiveness; 
proof . . . of a matter of fact or law.”) 
 306. Defined as: “in regard to the matter in question; with reference to a quality or condition 
that is specified or inherent.” WEBSTER’S, supra note 305, specifically. Defined as: “suited by 
nature, character, or design to a particular use, purpose, or situation.” Id., adapted. 
 307. Unnecessary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 309 (defining unnecessary as “not 
required under the circumstances.”) 
 308. For example, a time, place, and manner restriction (a type of restriction which Justice 
Scalia referenced in Heller as being presumptively constitutional) compared with a categorical ban 
on a type of firearm. 
 309. Heller, 554 U.S. at 693 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 310. Substantial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 305 (defining substantial as “strong, 
solid, and firm; Considerable in amount or value; real and not imaginary; having actual, not 
fictitious, existence.”); Substantial, WEBSTER’S, supra note 305 (defining substantial as 
“[s]omething having substance or actual existence.”) 
 311. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 939–40 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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which the British right to bear arms has been almost completely 
eliminated evidences the necessity of this consideration. Historically, the 
regulation of firearms in Great Britain has been driven by knee jerk 
reactions by Parliament without any regard as to whether empirical data 
justifies the financial cost or the damage done to individual liberties by 
imposing further regulations on firearms. If the Court chose to review 
Second Amendment challenges subject to strict scrutiny, it would be 
foreclosing on many gun regulations which might actually improve 
public safety. Choosing the less strict standard of intermediate scrutiny 
would leave too much room for discretionary judgments, which could 
lead to the piecemeal derogation of the right to bear arms in the United 
States.
312
 Because of the complex competing interests on both sides of 
Second Amendment challenges, it is reasonable to require the 
government to make some level of heightened showing of reliable 
empirical data to support the imposition of regulations limiting the 
exercise of the Second Amendment right. The proposed framework 
would ensure that the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens 
are sufficiently protected, while also allowing for the imposition of 
common sense and empirically-based gun regulations. Furthermore, this 
framework would, in theory, foster consistency in Second Amendment 
jurisprudence by establishing a clear standard for both the government 
and judges to rely upon when considering the viability of firearm 
regulations. It would also encourage further scholarly research into the 
connection between guns, crime, criminal psychology, the use of firearms 
in society, the effectiveness of education and prevention programs, and 
the methods used by law enforcement to combat gun violence. As Baker 
and McPhedran stated in their study on Australia’s firearm statistics: 
If policy is to be truly effective, it must have clearly 
defined outcomes and it must be able to bring about those 
outcomes. The desired, and implied, outcome of firearms 
legislation is to achieve an improvement in public health and 
safety by minimizing firearms abuse and misuse. Such aims 
may be difficult to achieve when legislation is drafted in the 
political arena . . . . [F]irearms policy development should be 
based on empirical data, careful evaluation of that empirical 
data, and community understanding and acceptance of the 
proposed legislation.313 
Because judges are not in the position to make policy, it is 
reasonable to require the legislature to conduct an objective inquiry and 
 
 312. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 561. 
 313. Baker & McPhedran, supra note 73, at 12–13. 
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formulate the most effective and efficient means to implement a policy, 
with reliable data supporting its imposition. If the government can 
provide sufficient empirical data to support the imposition of a particular 
firearm regulation, it follows that the law can surely be specifically 
adapted so as to advance the governmental objective while also avoiding 
unnecessary collateral infringement on the Second Amendment rights of 
law-abiding citizens. 
The strength of this test can be demonstrated by applying it to the 
longstanding tradition of prohibiting felons from possessing firearms. 
The imposition of this particular regulation can easily be justified by 
referencing the underlying criminal recidivism statistics. Criminal 
recidivism rates have been thoroughly studied and analyzed to produce 
reliable data regarding the likelihood of criminal recidivism based on six 
“criminal history categories” (“CHC”).
314
 For example, criminals in CHC 
I have, “a substantially lower risk of recidivating within two years 
(13.8%) than do offenders in CHC VI (55.2%).
315
 Thus, if one were to 
apply the proposed pragmatic test to this example, it would meet 
constitutional muster. The government would only be required to make a 
moderate inquiry due to the nature of the interests at stake and the fact 
that the constitutional rights of felons have been traditionally limited in 
these types of circumstances. Based on the recidivism rates, which tend 
to demonstrate that convicted felons are far more likely to be involved in 
a subsequent crime after their release, the government would meet its 
burden to show there is a verifiable basis for the imposition of the law. 
Second, because the law only applies to convicted felons, there is very 
little threat of any collateral infringement on the rights of law-abiding 
citizens. 
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, as 
well as the Seventh Circuit in general, have effectively incorporated the 
use of statistics to evaluate Second Amendment challenges.
316
 Moreover, 
 
 314. Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (May 2004), https://www.ussc.gov/research/
research-publications/measuring-recidivism-criminal-history-computation-federal-sentencing-
guidelines. 
 315. Id. at 6. 
 316. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940; see also United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 
2010) (per curium) (declaring a law prohibiting illegal drug users from possessing a firearm 
constitutional, based in part on studies showing a connection between substance abuse and violent 
crime. “Ample academic research confirms the connection between drug use and violent crime. For 
example, nearly four times as many adults arrested for serious crimes had used an illegal drug in 
the previous year than had not.”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding a law prohibiting convicted domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing a 
firearm. The court based its opinion on the state’s “strong showing” that reliable empirical data 
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the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in three major Second Amendment cases 
demonstrates the benefit of requiring the government to make a strong 
showing of empirical data to support the imposition of the challenged 
regulation. In United States v. Skoien, the majority declined to delve 
deeply into the “levels of scrutiny quagmire,” but instead required the 
government to make a strong showing to support the imposition of the 
challenged regulation.
317
 The regulation before the court in Skoien 
prohibited domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing a 
firearm.
318
 The court upheld the law as constitutional.
319
 In so concluding, 
the Seventh Circuit determined an overwhelming amount of research 
showed, first, very high recidivism rates among convicted domestic 
violence misdemeanants (Skoien himself was a recidivist).
320
 Secondly, 
research demonstrated a very high mortality rate when firearms are 
involved in domestic violence incidents.
321
 Thus, the court determined 
the government met its burden to make a strong showing that prohibiting 
a class of persons who are statistically likely to be involved in multiple 
domestic violence incidents as well as statistically prone to using firearms 
in the course of said incident, was a necessary measure to protect public 
safety.
322
 An additional factor in the court’s conclusion was that the 
regulation before the court provided for “expungement, pardon, or 
restoration of civil rights” whereby, upon a proper showing, an individual 
would no longer be prohibited from possessing a firearm.
323
 
Similarly, in United States v. Yancey, the Seventh Circuit upheld a 
federal law prohibiting illegal drug users from possessing a firearm.
324
 
After requiring the government to make the same strong showing as in 
 
demonstrated a very high recidivism rate (ranging from 40% to 80%) among domestic violence 
misdemeanants, coupled with the fact that incidents of domestic violence involving a firearm are 
twelve times more likely to result in death). 
 317. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641–42. 
 318. Id. at 639. 
 319. See id. at 645. 
 320. Id. at 645. 
 321. Id. at 643. 
 322. Id. at 644–46. 
 323. Id. at 644. 
 324. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685 (“[h]abitual drug abusers, like the mentally ill, are more likely to 
have difficulty exercising self-control, making it dangerous for them to possess deadly firearms.”); 
see also Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Symposium, The Second Amendment Limitations and 
Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 1339, 1361 (2009) (“[t]he Founders viewed the 
right to arms as inextricably linked with the right to vote as incidents of full citizenship: those who 
were armed were entitled to vote and those who voted were entitled to bear arms. Thus, it is 
particularly relevant to note that the right to vote may constitutionally be denied to convicted 
criminals and the insane. By parity of reasoning it seems clear that persons convicted of serious 
criminal offenses may be prohibited from possessing guns.”). 
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Skoien, the court determined the government met its burden by providing 
a large number of studies which demonstrated a strong connection 
between illegal drug use and violent crime.
325
 “Ample academic research 
confirms the connection between drug use and violent crime. For 
example, nearly four times as many adults arrested for serious crimes had 
used an illegal drug in the previous year than had not.”
326
 Additionally, 
and similar to Skoien, the court noted that illegal drug users could regain 
their right to possess a firearm by ending their drug abuse.
327
 
Most recently, in Moore v. Madigan, the plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of an Illinois law prohibiting people from carrying a gun 
“ready to use (loaded, immediately accessible—that is, easy to reach—
and uncased),” with few exceptions, primarily for law enforcement.
328
 
Judge Posner, writing for the majority, determined that based on the 
available empirical data, the government failed to make a strong showing 
to support the challenged regulation.
329
 Judge Posner stated, “Illinois had 
to provide us with more than merely a rational basis for believing that its 
uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety.”
330
 
While the majority did conduct a limited historical analysis of 
prohibitions similar to the challenged regulation, it largely relied upon 
theoretical and empirical evidence in reaching its conclusion.
331
 First, the 
court rejected the argument that the Heller opinion was narrowly limited 
to the right to possess a firearm for self-defense within one’s home.
332
 
The court stated, “a Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be attacked 
on the sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in his apartment building 
on the 35th floor of the Park Tower” and that “[t]o confine the right to be 
armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of 
self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.”
333
 
Next, the court addressed available empirical evidence examining 
relevant trends related to the carriage of firearms in public.
334
 On this 
 
 325. Yancey, 621 F.3d . at 685–87. 
 326. Id. at 686 (citing Illicit Drug Use Among Persons Arrested for Serious Crimes, OFFICE OF 
APPLIED STUD., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN. 2–3 (2005), 
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k5/arrests/arrests.pdf). 
 327. Id. 
 328. Moore, 702 F.3d at 934. 
 329. Id. at 942. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 937. 
 333. Id. (In reaching its conclusion the court referenced a number of historical records 
including Blackstone’s description of the right to bear arms for self-preservation “[a]s a 
fundamental natural right of Englishmen, on a par with seeking redress in the courts or petitioning 
the government”). 
 334. Moore, 702 F.3d at 937. 
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point, the court found the majority of studies to be, at best, inconclusive 
in demonstrating an association between public carriage of firearms and 
crime rates in general or murder rates in particular.
335
 The court noted 
studies which, in an indirect way, reached a different conclusion.
336
 
However, the court found these studies unpersuasive because they either 
did not address the issue before the court (i.e. the connection between 
public carriage of firearms and crime rather than increased gun ownership 
and crime),
337
 or the study had been rebutted or its methods called into 
question by subsequent research examining the same data.
338
 The court 
concluded stating, “In sum, the empirical literature on the effects of 
allowing the carriage of guns in public fails to establish a pragmatic 
defense of the Illinois law.”
339
 The court determined that in Heller the 
Supreme Court unambiguously determined the Second Amendment right 
would not depend on “causalty counts.”
340
 “If the mere possibility that 
allowing guns to be carried in public would increase the crime or death 
rates sufficed to justify a ban, Heller would have been decided the other 
way.”
341
 
The three Seventh Circuit cases discussed above demonstrate the 
benefits of referencing empirical data as part of the court’s determination 
of whether the challenged law permissibly or impermissibly burdens the 
Second Amendment right. As demonstrated by these three opinions from 
different panels on the Seventh Circuit, placing the burden on the 
government to make a showing of empirical data supporting the 
imposition of the regulation facilitates consistency in Second 
Amendment jurisprudence. Additionally, the results of these cases meet 
the goal set forth in the introduction to this note—that application of the 
proposed pragmatic test would both protect the right afforded to law 
 
 335. Id. at 937–38 (quoting Robert A. Hahn et al., Firearms Laws and the Reduction of 
Violence: A systematic Review, 28 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 40, 59 (2005) (“Based on findings 
from national law assessments, cross-national comparisons, and index studies, evidence is 
insufficient to determine whether the degree or intensity of firearms regulation is associated with 
decreased (or increased) violence.” (internal quotations omitted)); Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & 
Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare 
Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1082 (2009) (“Based on available empirical data, therefore, 
we expect relatively little public safety impact if courts invalidate laws that prohibit gun carrying 
outside the home, assuming that some sort of permit system for public carry is allowed to stand.”). 
 336. Moore, 702 F.3d at 938. 
 337. See id. (citing Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1112 
(2001)). 
 338. See id. at 939 (citing Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, More Guns, Less Crime Fails 
Again: The Latest Evidence from 1977–2006, 6 ECON. J. WATCH 218, 224 (2009)). 
 339. See id. at 939. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
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abiding citizens by the Second Amendment and also permit pragmatic 
regulation of that right in circumstances where empirical data supports, 
to the requisite degree, the need for the regulation. Furthermore, under 
the proposed pragmatic test, judges retain a certain amount of discretion, 
albeit not an unlimited amount, to determine what level of showing the 
government is required to make depending upon the unique 
circumstances of each case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Second Amendment right to bear arms is uniquely enshrined in 
the United States Constitution and American culture. A balance must be 
struck between the competing interests which unavoidably arise on each 
side of Second Amendment considerations. A survey of the genesis and 
efficacy of firearms regulations in Australia, Canada, and the UK tends 
to show that empirical data can play an important role in the process of 
judicial review of Second Amendment challenges in the United States. 
Furthermore, Second Amendment challenges cannot be appropriately 
reviewed under one of the traditional standards of scrutiny. Justice 
Breyer’s interest balancing test does not provide a sufficient framework 
for lower courts and its application would lead to inconsistencies in 
Second Amendment jurisprudence, much like what currently exists. The 
proposed pragmatic test incorporates aspects of both the traditional 
standards of scrutiny as well as the interest balancing test. Adoption of 
this pragmatic test would enable legislatures to enact evidence-based 
firearms regulations, while also protecting the Second Amendment rights 
of law-abiding citizens. Additionally, it would foster consistency in 
Second Amendment jurisprudence, and eliminate the risk of lower courts 
getting stuck in the scrutiny quagmire.  
